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Sanction lists as published by national and supranational organizations contain details on sanctioned entities. Those lists have 
to be obeyed in order to avoid legal implications. Yet, sanction lists are of very low information quality. Nevertheless, 
regulatory compliance demands, that organizations check their customer master data against sanction lists. We analyze 
sanction lists in this contribution with respect to their information quality and derive from this analysis requirements on a 
compliant system. We present a case study of a software vendor that equipped its information system with an extension that 
enables organizations to comply with sanction lists. We provide details on its implementation and evaluation. 
Keywords 
Master Data Management, Regulatory Compliance, Sanction Lists, Case Study, Embargo. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past embargos limited the external trade with certain countries. Their main focus was the suppression of all kinds of 
actions and legal endorsements with a whole country. Depending on the restrictions an embargo imposed, it can be 
differentiated between total, partial and weapons embargo. After the September 11 attacks the situation changed. A new 
entity related embargo mechanism came into place. Subject to this kind of embargos are individual and legal entities 
independently of their location, such as natural persons, organizations and enterprises. The usage of this kind of embargo is 
increasing and it can be observed to substitute over time the classical country wide embargo. 
While this entity specific embargo seems more desirable, as it does not oblige sanctions on uninvolved civilians, it is more 
difficult to implement. To enforce these embargos enterprises now have to check every transaction, whether it corresponds to 
a sanctioned entity or not. Essentially, organizations need to check, whether their customer master data contains sanctioned 
entities. Yet, it is in the nature of many sanctioned entities to hide reliable contact information from the public. Furthermore, 
intelligence agencies that might possess reliable information are usually not willing to publish them neither. This results in 
sanction lists, that are incomplete, ambiguously, contradictory, inaccurate thus error-prone. This is actually an information 
quality issue, as the provided information has a limited “fitness for use”. At the end of the day, compliance demands from 
companies to take reliable decisions on unreliable information. 
Regulatory compliance, as we discuss it here, refers to the goal that public agencies and organizations pursue in their efforts 
to ensure that their personnel are aware of and take steps to comply with relevant laws and regulations. While the involved 
steps may be taken in several areas, we focus here on the compliance related to master data (Kokemüller and Weisbecker, 
2009). Master data is defined by the International Organization for Standardization (2009) as the data that “describes entities 
that are independent and fundamental for the organization; [It] needs to be referenced in order to perform transactions”. This 
definition emphasizes the importance of master data compliance: As master data is referenced by transactions, non-compliant 
master data will result in non-compliant transactions. Furthermore, as master data is referenced often, its non-compliance is 
multiplied into various transactions of an organization. This makes master data an effective starting point for a compliance 
initiative. 
Design science research contributions present novel Information Systems (IS) artifacts and suitable evaluation approaches 
that address the artifact’s appropriateness to contribute to the problems’ solution (Nunamaker Jr, Chen and Purdin, 1991). 
These two facets of rigorous design science-oriented research contribute to the foundations and the methodologies pool of 
Information Systems research, i.e. they contribute to its knowledge base (Hevner, March, Park and Ram, 2004). In our work 
we follow this research paradigm.  
We therefore first analyze the problem domain, design and implement a suitable IS artifact and evaluate it then against the 
problem domain. The remainder of this paper is thus structured as follows: First, we continue with legal implications and 
Kokemüller  Master Data Compliance: The Case of Sanction Lists 
 
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Lima, Peru, August 12-15, 2010. 2 
information quality issues related to regulatory compliance with sanction lists. The next section then provides a brief review 
of relevant literature before we continue with the systems design. Afterwards, we provide details on its realization and 
evaluate it against the problem domain. We then discuss our approach and address some limitations before we conclude.  
Legal implications 
In Germany embargos are enforced by supervisory duties1 whereto: The Management Board and their authorized 
representatives have to take reasonable organizational measures to ensure with a sufficient degree of probability that no 
infringements are committed due to negligence or intent. In case of infringements of the German Foreign Trade Act2, the 
responsible executives in the company are personally liable for penal action. These persons can only be discharged through 
evidence of a working organization and the effective performance of the required and appropriate supervisory duties. 
The German legislator formulated a severe threat of punishment: In the worst case, up to 15 years of imprisonment and a fine 
of up to 500,000 Euro, turnover levy, forfeiture and confiscation. Without the contribution of significant criminal energy, a 
violation of the EU antiterrorism regulation is likely to be considered as breach of embargo pursuant3. In this case, the threat 
of punishment is not less than two years of imprisonment, which – if convicted – typically excludes a suspension on 
probation. In minor cases the threat of punishment ranges from three months to five years of imprisonment (Gensior-Mages 
and Drabe, 2009). 
For German address owners, there are three relevant entities, which define sanctioned entities: the UN4, EU5 and the German 
Government6. Whereas due to international treaties the UN lists are integrated into the EU lists and the EU and German lists 
are essentially synchronized. The German lists are subject to a fee and include, additionally to the EU lists the current US 
sanction lists. Some countries outside the EU define additional sanction lists, those countries include the US and Japan. 
Those sanction lists may be ignored by German address owners while they are not active in those countries, otherwise they 
must be respected. 
Information Quality 
Information quality is often defined as the information’s “fitness for use”. For a deeper understanding of this concept, Wang 
and Strong (1996) identified 15 relevant information quality dimensions. These 15 dimensions are grouped into 4 categories 
(Intrinsic, Contextual, Representational, and Accessibility). For our discussion we divide the dimension of completeness 
further. We differentiate between coverage, i.e. how many of all sanctioned entities are included in the list and density, i.e. 
how exhaustive are the entries of a sanctioned entity. In Table 1 the EU sanction list is analyzed in each of these 15 
dimensions. For three exemplary sanction list entries, please refer to Appendix A. This analysis led to four different types of 
results. The information is in some quality dimensions normative (Believability, Objectivity, Reputation, Timeliness, and 
Coverage), the next type is of mere observational character (Relevancy, Value-added, Concise representation, consistent 
representation, understandability, and ease of manipulation). The dimensions of the third group are requirements on a 
compliant information system (Interpretability, Timeliness and Accessibility). Finally, there are real drawbacks (Free of 
error, Density, and Appropriate amount of data) in information quality that form challenges for a compliant information 
system.  
For a compliant implementation of sanction lists, organizational processes need to be adjusted and documented to prove their 
effectiveness and reasonable coverage. It has to be assured, that every transaction that would lead to a proliferation of 
economic resources is correctly checked against the sanction list. Obviously, this not only requires the implementation of 
adequate processes but equally important the adjustment of information system to perform necessary checks. The SPH AG is 
an independent software vendor that develops a Customer Relationship Management system specially tailored for direct 
                                                          
1 §130, §9 OWiG (Administrative Offence Act), §14 StGB (Penal Code) 
2 §70 AWV (German Foreign Trade Act) and AWG (German Foreign Trade Law) 
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marketing. It decided to develop a specialized service as an enhancement to its existing solution. SPH AG essentially decided 
to offer to its customers a service to automatically detect sanctioned entities in their customer data base. To this end an 
algorithm to precisely identify sanctioned entities was developed. This contribution provides details on this case. 
Table 1:  Analysis of information quality dimension with respect to sanction list compliance 
Information Quality 
Dimension 






The information source is normative with respect to these information quality 
dimensions. Although the score in these dimensions might not always be very high, 
other sources may only be worse. This is mainly due to the political decision 
involved in formulating an entity specific embargo. 
Normative 




Timeliness With respect to timeliness the information source is normative. Therefore, only the 
most recent sanction list should be employed. 
Normative / 
Requirement 
Relevancy The information is for compliance very relevant. Observation 
Value-added The information adds value as it reduces the risk for fines. Observation 
Completeness Here it must be distinguished between coverage and density. As it is normative, the 
sanction list is complete in coverage. Nevertheless, the density is very low, thus 





The amount of data is unsatisfactory, as an unambiguous decision whether a contact 
is a sanctioned entity or not is in most cases not possible. 
Challenge 
Category: Representational 
Interpretability Compliance demands, that the user of an information system has very low 
interpretability, whether a contact is sanctioned or not. This requires that the 




Sanction lists are usually available as XML Data. Observation 
Consistent 
representation 
To the EU sanction list a DTD schema is present. Observation 
Understandability Contained data is usually understandable independently, yet the usefulness of the 
address “By the Shrine Next to the Gas Station” (Figure 2) is questionable. 
Observation 
Category: Accessibility 
Accessibility Likewise, compliance demands, that sanctions are enforced. Thus, the information 
has to be easily accessible. Note, that this does not require that a user is informed 
that a contact is a suspected terrorist but only that transactions have to be stopped. 
Requirement 
Ease of manipulation Sanction lists are and should not be editable by companies Observation 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Challenges coming from error-prone and low density data are related to fuzzy searches. The information quality literature 
discussed these algorithms under a multitude of names. Most common are reference reconciliation, merge/purge problem, 
record linkage, duplicate (record) detection, or duplicate elimination. While some of these may contain slightly different 
connotations, at the end of the day they pursue the same goal: Identifying duplicate references to identical real world entities 
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in noisy data. Elmagarmid, Ipeirotis and Verykios (2007); Gu, Baxter, Vickers and Rainsford (2003) and Rahm and Do 
(2000) give a concise resume of the current practice. 
In general the problem is twofold. First, in comparing all n customers with all m sanctioned entities, the complexity of the 
algorithm is of the order ( )n m . Especially n may grow large, which renders a search over the complete Cartesian product 
unfeasible. On this behalf Hernández and Stolfo (1998) proposed the Sorted-Neighborhood Method (SNM). Here records are 
ordered using a key build of the attributes that contain the most information. This results in a sequence where similar records 
are situated close to each other. Next, only records within a window of a certain width are compared. A different approach is 
chosen by Monge and Elkan (1997), they assume that similar objects are always found close to each other and compare 
records only with the 4 previously encountered duplicate clusters. Monge and Elkan (1997) show, that their algorithm runs 
efficiently, yet the precision7 and recall8 are not as high as in the SNM approach. Both algorithms though are designed for 
comparing one dataset internally, thus are efficient in selecting only those records of one dataset that have a high probability 
of being duplicates. In comparing customers with a sanction list, records from two different data sets need to be compared. 
Once decided which records to compare, the second problem domain needs to be addressed: Defining how two records are 
compared. Cohen, Ravikumar and Fienberg (2003) analyze several string distance metrics. They conclude that the tf.idf 
algorithm performs best in their testbed. This token-based similarity measure assigns higher importance to tokens (token 
frequency: tf) that are less common in the document (inverse document frequency: idf). Bilenko, Mooney, Cohen, Ravikumar 
and Fienberg (2003) discuss a trainable algorithm that may perform well if trained well. Nevertheless, regulatory compliance 
to sanction lists demands a reproducible outcome of an algorithm, something a trainable algorithm cannot provide. 
SYSTEM DESIGN 
As we had observed, that both low interpretability and high accessibility have to be ensured, we now design an IS artifact 
that extends an information system providing accessible and unambiguous information to the user. The first three use cases 
describe the scenarios in which addresses need to be checked against the sanction list: 
– Cleansing of entire database: In case of a newly released sanction list, the whole customer data set is checked 
against the new sanction list. Likewise, this is done in initial cleansing. 
– Verification of single entity: Whenever an address record is created, the software checks whether the entity is 
included in the sanction list. 
– Cleansing of external lists: Externally purchased or leased lists are checked against the sanction list prior to using 
them. Suspicious records should be excluded from further processes (advertising measures, inclusion in the system) 
The final two use cases describe how suspicious addresses are handled: 
– Automatic exclusion of identified addresses: If an address can be marked unambiguously as sanctioned, it is blocked 
automatically. 
– Manual batch processing: Decisions in ambiguous cases are decided by authorized personnel manually. 
Requirements 
We now continue with requirements a system needs to fulfill to provide above presented use cases. Observing the sanction 
lists we recognize that most attributes are left empty. Usually no address, occasionally a town, sometimes only a first or last 
name is given. The demands arising out of the information quality dimensions of density (completeness) and appropriate 
amount of data lead us to the first requirement: 
Requirement I The comparison needs to function with sparse data. 
                                                          
7 Precision increases, if detected duplicates are real duplicates. High precision may be achieved by comparing entities very 
strictly. Thus this optimization leads to many undetected duplicates. 
8 Recall increases, with the number of detected real duplicates. High recall may be achieved by detecting as many duplicates 
as possible. Yet, this also increases the number of entities falsely identified as duplicates. 
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Addresses in the sanction list are of different types. The XML Representation of the EU list distinguishes “P” for Individuals 
and “E” for organizations as companies or institutions: 
Requirement II The comparison needs to cope with different entity types. 
Regulatory compliance demands from an organization to enforce the embargo by all reasonable measure. Therefore it is 
required: 
Requirement III The comparison must produce as many correct hits as possible. At the same time it has to be very strict 
otherwise a significant amount of post-processing is necessary or lost sales opportunities would occur. 
Especially transcribed names are included in the sanction list in a variety of spelling alternatives or mistakes. To cope with 
the information quality dimension of freeness of error we thus require: 
Requirement IV High variety in spelling alternatives should be resolved. Including the recognition of phonetic 
differences and similarities. 
Additionally, entities are represented with several different names, addresses, birthdates, and passports. We are thus left with 
a sparse but complex comparison space. Based on the information quality dimension of freeness of error we additionally 
require: 
Requirement V Attributes with cardinality higher than one should correctly be assigned to a single entity. 
REALIZATION 
To reduce the number of necessary comparisons, a Multipass-SNM approach was chosen. Effectivly, to every entry in the 
sanction list several keys are computed. A key is configurable but it is usually assembled of the first few letters of an attribute 
with high information density as firstname, lastname, or wholename. Different keys of one entity are often permutations of 
other keys. This is useful, as keys are used for lexicographic ordering and therefore permutations define different sequences. 
Figure 1 shows exemplary keys for the sanctioned entity shown in Figure 4 (Appendix A). 
For a contact, the same keys are computed. Afterwards, for every key the index in the sanction list is searched, where it 
would belong following the lexicographic order. Then all sanctioned entities within a specified window surrounding the 
computed virtual insert location are identified. Those entities are added to the initially empty comparison list. The procedure 
is repeated for the next key configuration and the identified sanctioned entities are merged into the comparison list, thus 
duplicate entries are only included once. This procedure is repeated until all configured keys are processed. In this manner 
the group of sanctioned entities for pair wise comparison is identified. 
The field wholename contains often permutations of the fields firstname and lastname. One could argue that the 
field wholename should then be discarded. Yet, it has a much higher density than the other two fields. Moreover, the name 
of an organization is always included as a wholename. Therefore, only the field wholename is used for comparison. The 
fields firstname and lastname are used to fill the field wholename if it is encountered empty. 
The comparison is then done using a token-based similarity measure. Strings are split into n  overlapping tokens of length q 
called q-gramms. To every q-gramm it is then counted how many times it occurs in the contact cqn  respective the sanctioned 
entity sqn . The similarity of two strings is then the normalized Euclidean product of the q-gramm counts. The normalization is 
achieved using the number of all q-gramms of the contact cn  and the sanctioned entity sn . The similarity iS  of the attribute 
i  is thus given by 
1







  . 
Finally, we compute the weighted similarity S  for the entire entity using the weights iw  
 ·i i
i
S w S . 
The result of the comparison is limited to the most similar sanctioned entity, its similarity measure, and a similarity 
classification. Based on configurable threshold contacts are classified as either certainly, probably, probably not, and 
certainly not being a sanctioned entity.  
The algorithm is implemented to be configurable with respect to the sorting keys, the q-gramm length and class boundaries. 
Some additional measures have been taken, to improve the run-time behavior. Especially all computations, which can be 
done during initialization, are performed then. This increases the need for memory while it decreases the processing time 
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needed for a single check. Most important, all computations on the sanction lists, as the parsing, key generation, and sorting 
are done during initialization. 
To prove the compliance with regulations an organization has to provide evidence of the effective performance of the 
required and appropriate supervisory duties. In other words, it has to provide evidence, that a certain contact was checked 
against the sanction lists using documented parameters. To this end a log is written that documents every compared contact 
and its result. Additionally, every change in parameters is logged.  
EVALUATION 
The evaluation of the approach was done in a focus group interview with five customers of the SPH AG. During the 
interview it was recognized by the customers, that a comparison based on the identity of attributes of the customer data with 
the sanction list is not sufficient. This is owed to the poor information quality, especially in the dimensions free of error, 
completeness and appropriate amount of data. In contrast, the above described approach and algorithm was considered to 
provide a reasonable solution. Especially, due to the configurability a broad acceptance could be achieved. This is 
understandable as it is a business decision, whether to take more risk or to loose more sales opportunities. To this decision, 
only guidelines for the configuration but no fixed solution may be provided. 
The presented algorithm aggregates attribute values to cope with the special challenge of sparse data (Requirement I). By 
comparing entities based on the wholename, persons and organizations can be detected likewise (Requirement II). The 
matching algorithm and its thresholds are configurable. This enables organization to choose the configuration that best fits 
their needs (Requirement III). Currently, attributes with a cardinality higher one result in several entries of one entity. While 
this is possibly not the best solutions, it assigns every entry to an entity (Requirement V). It is questionable, whether other 
approaches would lead to better results. At the same time, the chosen approach guarantees, that to every entity all known 
spelling alternatives are correctly assigned (Requirement IV). We recognize that all requirements are met. 
Those requirements were formulated to make best use of sanction lists in spite of their low information quality. The 
information quality dimension of freeness of error has been addressed by fuzzy search algorithms. Here we employed 
algorithms for duplicate detection. The dimension of density and appropriate amount of data are addressed by aggregation 
information into the field wholename. Finally, the information quality dimensions of low interpretability and high 
accessibility had to be dealt with. In this paper, this was done by proposing an IS artifact as an extension to an existing 
Customer Relationship Management solution. It was thus effectively integrated into already deployed business processes 
involving contact data. 
Furthermore, the implementation was evaluated in its run-time behavior. To this end it was deployed in a virtual Windows 
Key 1 Key 2 Key 3 
BinUsa UsaBin Abu 
BinUsa UsaBin Al 
BinUsá UsáBin Ben 
  Ben 
  Ben 
  Bin 
  Bin 
  Muh 
  Ous 
  Sha 
  Usa 
  Usa 
  Usá 
Figure 1: Exemplary Keys 
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XP machine on VMWare ESX running on an IBM Blade Center. The guest environment can therefore be compared to a 
standard PC. Certainly, this is not a very accurate description, yet there are many influences on the run-time behavior, 
including the .Net Framework, that an error free measurement seams unfeasible.  
For the run-time behavior it has to be distinguished between the first call and all subsequent calls. As during the first call 
several start-up computations are performed it takes approx. 3s, thus non-negligible time. All subsequent calls profit from this 
trade off. They need an average comparison time per customer of 0.004s. This is of the same magnitude as algorithms for 
duplicate detection. We therefore consider it as a good result. 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Most enterprises need to run a compliant business with respect to sanction lists. At the same time, the lists provide by the 
governmental authorities are only of very little information quality. A service provided by the government with a contact as 
its arguments that would give a concise answer whether a contact is a sanctioned entity or not could provide reliable answers. 
Yet, enterprises do not want to display all their business contacts to the authorities which renders this option void. 
Effectively, every enterprise needs to check its contacts on its own against sanction lists. Based on an analysis of sanction 
lists in 15 information quality dimensions, we formulated requirements for a compliant information system. While several 
algorithms have been presented to resolve duplicate entries in customer data bases, the problem domain of reliably 
identifying sanctioned entities in the customer data base still bears several challenges. In this contribution we showed how 
algorithms for duplicate detection may be applied to this problem domain. 
Several enhancements to our algorithm might be thought of. First of all, phonetic string comparisons could be implemented. 
This is a challenging task, because names in the sanction lists are in various languages that are difficult to compare. Still, it 
may provide useful results we therefore plan this as future work. Additionally, we recognize that the string comparison 
algorithm that we are currently using could be enhanced by using a tf.idf algorithm. 
Sanction lists are available in several formats (xls, pdf, xml, etc.). For automatic comparisons the xml versions are especially 
useful. The xml lists are furthermore normalized. To every entity potentially several names, addresses, birthdates, and 
passports are assigned. Currently, these cardinalities are not evaluated. Every entry is currently seen as essentially one 
independent entity. Nevertheless, several entries may represent the same entity resulting from denormalization. Thus, the 
extension of the xml lists do not suffer any information loss, only information based on the intention may get lost and could 
be used to further enhance the algorithm. 
CONCLUSION 
An increasing use of sanction lists for the enforcement of entity specific embargos can be observed. Legislators usually 
formulate substantial threats on those, who do not comply with sanction lists. It is therefore important to employ reliable 
mechanisms for master data compliance. The natural choice, to achieve compliance regarding the customer master data, is by 
extending a customer relationship management solution. Realizing that, the SPH AG developed a specialized service as an 
extension to its solution to automatically detect sanctioned entities. 
Yet, this is not a trivial task, as sanction lists are of poor information quality. In this contribution we therefore analyzed 
sanction lists with respect to its information quality in 15 dimensions. Based on this analysis we then designed an information 
systems artifact, which provides a reliable comparison with low quality data. This works as an enabler to master data 
compliance with respect to sanctioned entities, being individual or legal entities. 
Following the design science approach we first analyzed the problem domain of master data compliance in the special case of 
sanction lists. We then presented the concept and architecture of an IS artifact that enables organizations to comply with 
sanction lists. We than evaluated it against the formulated requirements, which is according to Hevner et al. (2004) a suitable 
descriptive method for the evaluation of an IS artifact. In this contribution we have discussed the need for compliance with 
sanction lists. We then outlined the organizational requirements on a compliant information system. On the implementation 
of the IS artifact we showed how those requirements may be met. 
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APPENDIX A: EXEMPLARY SANCTION LIST ENTRIES 
NAME 
LASTNAME FIRSTNAME MIDDLENAME WHOLENAME GENDER 
   Al-Shifa Honey Press For 
Industry And Commerce 
 
ADDRESS 
NUMBER STREET ZIPCODE CITY COUNTRY 
 Al-Hasabah PO Box 8089 Sanaa YEM 
 By the Shrine Next to the Gas 
Station, Jamal Street 
 Taiz YEM 
 Al-Arudh Square, Khur Maksar  Aden YEM 
 Al-Nasr Street  Doha QAT 
Figure 2: Exemplary sanction list entry 
NAME 
LASTNAME FIRSTNAME MIDDLENAME WHOLENAME GENDER 
Blé Goudé Charles   M 
   Gbapé Zadi  
ADDRESS 
NUMBER STREET ZIPCODE CITY COUNTRY 
 Bloc P 170  Yopougon Selmer CIV 
 Hotel Ivoire  Abidjan, Cocody CIV 
BIRTH 
DATE PLACE COUNTRY   
1972-01-01 Guibéroua (Gagnoa) CIV   
1972-01-01 Niagbrahio/Guiberoua CIV   
1972-01-01 Guiberoua CIV   
PASSPORT 
NUMBER COUNTRY    
04LE66241 (issued on 2005-11-10, valid 
until 2008-11-09) 
CIV    
AE/088 DH 12 (Diplomatic passport, 
issued on 2002-12-20, valid until 2005-
12-11) 
CIV    
98LC39292 (issued on 2000-11-24, valid 
until 2003-11-23) 
CIV    
C2310421 (Travel document issued on 
2005-11-15, valid until 2005-12-31) 
CHE    
CITIZEN 
COUNTRY     
CIV     
Figure 3: Exemplary sanction list entry 
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WHOLENAME GENDER TITLE LANGUAGE 
Bin Laden Usama Muhammed 
Awad 
 M Shaykh  
   Usama Bin Muhammed Bin Awad, 
Osama Bin Laden 
   
   Abu Abdallah Abd Al-Hakim    
   Oussama Ben Laden   FR 
Bin Laden Usama    Hajj  
   Ben Laden Osama    
   Ben Laden Ossama    
   Ben Laden Usama    
   Bin Laden Osama Mohamed Awdh    
   Bin Laden Usamah Bin Muhammad    
   Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin    
   Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin    
   Al Qaqa    
   Usáma bin Ládin   CS 
Bin Ládin Usáma  Muhammed Awad   SK 
BIRTH 
DATE PLACE COUNTRY     
1957-07-30 Jeddah SAU     
1957-07-28 Jeddah SAU     
1957-03-10 Jeddah SAU     
1957-01-01 Jeddah SAU     
1956 Jeddah SAU     
1957 Jeddah SAU     
1957-07-30  YEM     
1957-07-28  YEM     
1957-03-10  YEM     
1957-01-01  YEM     
1956  YEM     
1957  YEM     
CITIZEN 
COUNTRY       
SAU       
AFG       
Figure 4: Exemplary sanction list entry 
 
